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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRY SKOUSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

ALVIN I. SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.

I

Case No.
1· 11598

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff in the above entitled case sought to enforce payment of a promissory note drafted and executed by Defendant and payable according to its terms
to Plaintiff.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a
jury, The Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Judge. The
Court found the promissory note payable and granted
judgment to Plaintiff for $6,988.85 together with interest, attorney's fees, and costs, all totalling $11,417. 77.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Respondent, Jerry Skousen, seeks to
sustain the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff granted by
the Lower Court.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Jerry Skousen, is a resident of Mesa,
Arizona and the Defendant, Alvin I. Smith is a member
of the Utah Bar and a practicing Utah Attorney.
On or about February 1, 1962, Alvin I. Smith,
drafted and executed a promissory note in favor of
Jerry Skousen (R. 6) which read as follows:

PROMISSORY NOTE
February 1, 1962
$6,988.85
Two years after date, without grace, I promise
to pay to the order of Jerry Skousen, Six Thousand, Nine Hundred Eighty-Eight, and 85/100
($6,988.85) Dollars, for value received, with in2

terest from date at the rate of 6% per annum until paid. Principal and interest payable in Lawful
Money of the United States at Phoenix, Arizona,
and in case suit is instituted to collect this note or
any portion thereof, I promise to pay such additional sum as the Court may adjudge reasonable
as Attorney's fees in said suit.
It is understood and agreed that the drawer of
this note shall not be liable hereunder until and
unless payment is received from Clifford R.
"\V alker on notes executed by him in the total sum
of $13,977.70.
Isl Alvin I. Smith

Smith admitted at trial that in April of 1964,
he received a payment of $2,500.00 from Clifford R.
\Valker on the sum of $13,000.00 referred to in the subject note (R. 8-9).
Although the Walker notes to Smith were due and
owing early in 1964, when the $2,500.00 payment was
received, suit was not instituted by Smith against
'\Talker for payment until September 12, 1967, three
months after the Complaint in the instant case was
filed (May 23, 1967), and more than three years after
the Walker notes became due.
On May 23, 1967, Plaintiff, Jerry Skousen, filed
suit in the District Court for payment of the subject note.
This was more than five years after the date on the note;
and, Smith had received payment from Walker of
$2,500.00 "on notes executed by him in the total sum of
$13,977 .70."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL
CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE PROMISSORY NOTE TO
MAKE DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF WHEN DEFENDANT
RECEIVED PAYMENT FROM CLIFFORD
WALKER ON N 0 T E S EXECUTED BY
WALKER.

A.
The subject matter of this litigation is a promissory
note signed by Alvin Smith, (Defendant) in favor of ,
Jerry Skousen, (Plaintiff), and payable according to its
terms. Mr. Smith is an experienced attorney and a member of the Utah Bar; he drafted the note and executed it.
Mr. Skousen is a businessman. Both parties had experience in business transactions.
The subject note is relatively simple and provides
in pertinent part that "the drawer of this note [Alvin
Smith} shall not be liable hereunder until and unless
payment is received from Clifford R. Walker on notes
executed by him." (Emphasis added.) It was uncontroverted at trial that Clifford Walker had paid to Alvin
Smith $2,500.00 on notes executed by him, and that
Alvin Smith had credited the money to those notes.
Therefore, the only issue before the District Court
Judge was to construe the note and determine the intent
of the parties thereto. The proper construction of the
4

note was a question of law for the Trial Court. Pacific
States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corp., 5 Utah
;!d 244, 300 P.2d 610.
The issue before the Trial Court was to determine
the intent of the parties to the note as to how much Clifford R. 'V alker must pay to Alvin Smith before Smith
became liable to Skousen on the note. That is, does the
note require Clifford \Valker to make payment "on" his
notes, or "of" them. The Court construed the note to require the following:
That under the terms of said Promissory Note,
said Promissory Note was payable within two
years after date, provided the drawer of the note
had received payments on Promissory Notes,
which the Defendant held on Clifford R. Walker.
(Findings of Fact No. 2, emphasis added.)
There are three basic methods by which the Trial
Court could determine the intent of the parties to the
promissory note:
I. Hold the parties to their intent as expressed in

the writing itself unless bona fide ambiguities
make that impossible.
2. If there are ambiguities, resolve the issue of in-

tent by reference to other contemporary writings
of the parties.

:J. If there are no such writings, admit oral testi-

mony to demonstrate intent.
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This Court has clearly and definitely taken the first
position stating that the intent of the parties to a writing
will be determined from the language within its four
corners where the writing is reasonably free of ambiguity. Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah
2d 186, 415 P.2d 928 (1962); Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah
2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 (1960); Continental Bank and
Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773
(1957); Ephriam Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958); and Mathis v. Madsen,
261 P.2d 952 (1953).
The rule above is particularly applicable to this case
in a business transaction between experienced parties
where the complaining party is an experienced attorney.
The Trial Court may fairly have inferred that Mr. Smith
knew by virtue of his legal training and as a matter of
general knowledge, the difference between the phrases
"payment of a note" and "payment on a note," and that
he knew the former refers to a complete payment of a
note and the latter refers to a partial payment.
The note could not have been more simply or concisely stated: it suggests no other direction except that
Alvin Smith would become liable when Clifford R.
Walker made a payment on notes which he executed.
This rule represents a conscious policy decision on
the part of the Court. Parties should be held to their
clearly expressed intention or the orderly conduct of
affairs would quickly stop. If parties were allowed to
amend contracts to cover failure to think, or changes of
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mind, there would be no reliable and dependable contracts. Thus, Justice Henroid in Jens en Used Cars v.

Rice ( 1958) :

Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties.
But it is also elementary and of extreme practical
importance that we hold contracting parties to
their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them
as signatories thereto. Were this not so business,
one with another among our citizens, would be
relegated to the chaotic, and the basic purpose of
the law to supply enforceable rules of conduct for
the maintenance and improvement of an orderly
society's welfare and progress would find itself
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for language which he himself espouses.
Such language is the only implement he gives us
to fashion a determination as to the intentions of
the parties. Under such circumstances we should
not be required to embosom any request that we
ignore that very language. This is as it should be.
The rule excluding matters outside the four
corners of a clear, understandable document, is a
fair one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should extend no further than his own clear
express10ns.

Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259
(1958).

In addition, Utah law allows a finding of uncertainty or ambiguity by the Trial Court "only where there
is some genuine lac!..· of certainty," it does not refer to
"strained or merely fanciful or wishful interpretations
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that may be indulged in." aw v. N able, supra, 354 P.2tl
at 123. In the latter category surely belong Appellant's
demonstrations of the charges in the meaning of the
note which can be accomplished by changing words, substituting words, or playing with syntax (App. Brief
13-14, 18.
In interpreting a contract, the primary rule is to
determine what the parties intended by what they
said. The Court may not add, ignore or discard
words in the process, but attempts to render certain the meaning of the provision in dispute by an
objective and reasonable construction of the
whole contract.

Cornwall v. Willow Creeh; County Club, 13 Utah 2<l
160, 369 P.2d 928, 929 ( 1962, emphasis added).
In considering the controversy here it is well to
keep in mind the fundamental concepts in regard
to contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to
writing the conditions upon which the minds of
the parties have met and to fix their rights and
duties in respect thereto. The intent so expressed
is to be found, if possible within the four corners
of the instrument itself in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the words used. Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the language so that the meaning is confused, or is susceptible or more than one meaning, there is no
justification for interpretation or explanation
from extraneous sources. It would defeat the ver,Y
purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to
invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent
with its terms to prove that the parties did not
mean what they said, or to use such inconsistent
words to conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or
ambiguity where none would otherwise exist.
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Ephriam, Theater Company v. Hawk, supra at 22. Cf.
Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259
(1958).

Thus, by reference to the language of the note
above, it is clearly provided that payment by Clifford
'Valker on his notes to Alvin Smith make the latter liable
to Jerry Skousen for the face amount of the subject
note. The Trial Court so held.

B.
Even had the District Court initially viewed the
promissory note as ambiguous, it would have properly
construed the same in favor of Plaintiff and strictly
against the Defendant as its draftsman and an attorney.
Even assuming the note to be ambiguous, the Court
would have still referred to it first in determining the
intent of the parties thereto. Continental Bank and Trust
Company v. Bybee, supra; Mathis v. Madsen, supra. In
so doing it is elementary that a writing be construed
against its draf tman, and strictly so when the draftsman
is an attorney as in the case with Mr. Smith. In Continental Bank and Trust v. Bybee, supra, the Plaintiff,
an attorney, and draftsman of the subject writing, had
a dispute with a carpet company regarding a faulty carpet installed in his home. The Plaintiff Attorney therein
drafted a "release" which provided in part that the carpet
company pay the Attorney $100.00 and release him from
any indebtedness to the carpet company. The issue was
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whether the parties intended that Plaintiff be released
from his promissory note earlier negotiated to a holder
in due course. There as in the instant case, the Attorney
draftsman argued that his writing be construed to cover
a circumstance which he had failed to foresee; or, which
he forsaw, but failed to provide for when he drafted his
writing. The Court there said that since Bybee was both
the Attorney-draftsman of and a party to the instrument, the proper construction of the instrument should
be strictly against him. Continental Bank and Trust v.
Bybee, supra, 306 P.2d at 775.
It therefore follows that the District Court in strictly construing the promissory note against Defendant as
draftsman and attorney reasonably construed it to impose liability upon him two years after date thereof,
Clifford Walker having made payments on notes executed by him.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
NOT EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE Pow·ERS TO VARY THE MEANING OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE.
Even had the Trial Court initially felt that the
promissory note was a proper subject for the exercise of
its equitable powers, it is clear from the Findings of Fact
(No. 4) and the evidence at trial that Defendant was not
standing before the Court with "clean hands."
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First, Defendant wrote the language of which he
complained to the Court.
Second, Defendant made no effort to alleviate the
problem he created by his writing, but rather-as the
Trial Court specifically found (Finding of Fact No. 4
quoted infra )-sought to take advantage of the condition: thus, with reference to the language of the note
("unless payment is received from Clifford R. Walker
on notes executed by him"), and the fact that Clifford
Walker had made a $2,500.00 payment, Defendant
could claim-as he did in this case- that the note really
should have required full payment, and refuse to pay
Plaintiff as the note required. If, however, Mr. Skousen
agreed with the theory above and did not sue on the note,
Mr. Smith could simply wait more than six years before
proceeding against Walker and then allege-as Plaintiff
did here-that the note became due and owing upon the
first payment by Walker and that the statute of limitations had expired thereby nullifying an action by Skousen on the note.
The Trial Court in its Findings of Fact No. 4,
found:
The Court finds that the Defendant failed and
neglected or refused to take action against Clifford R. Walker on the Promissory Note which
the Plaintiff held until after the Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant; and, because of the statute of limitations and the possibility of the Plaintiff losing his cause of action on
the Promissory Note, his action would appear to
have been appropriately taken.
11

The Trial Court's fact findings reasonably supported by
evidence should be affirmed on Appeal Sine v. Harper,
118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571, 581 (1950).
In addition, the oral evidence introduced by Defendant was contrary to that necessary under Utah Law
for its reformation on the basis of mutual mistake of fact:
1. "Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error
in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to
writing." Peterson v. Paulson, 24 Wash. 2d 166, 163
P.2d 830, quoted in Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116,
307 P.2d 620 (1957).
2. "Evidence necessary to substantiate the mutual
mistake of fact must be clear, definite, and convincing
... " N.aisbitt v. Hodges, supra, at 623.
3. "The party seeking reformation should not be
guilty of negligence in the execution of the contract or
deed or latches in making timely application for its reformation." Id. at 623. See generally, Sine v. Harper,
supra.
The burden of proving mutual mistake was on Defendant, and the burden required was evidence "sufficiently clear and convincing" to satisfy the Court "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the existence of a mutual
mistake of fact. Sine v. Harper, supra, at 581.
With regard to requirements one and two, there
was no evidence before the Trial Court to demonstrate
an intention concurred in by both parties which Mr.
Smith failed to properly record. Certainly there was no
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evidence sufficient to have convinced the District Court
beyond a rea.sonable doubt. The most reasonable inf erence from the evidence is that Mr. Smith simply drafted
without thinking. The Courts have refused to protect
laymen under these circumstances and the District Court
therefore correctly refused an Attorney. Cf. Jensen
Used Cars v. Rice, supra.
\Vith reference to the third requirement, the Plaintiff, in his Complaint, specifically alleged failure, neglect, or ref us al on the part of Defendant to take action
in collecting the monies owed to him by Clifford Walker.
The evidence showed three years had lapsed during
which Defendant did not take action against Clifford
\'Valker, yet the evidence also showed Mr. Smith was
aware of Walker's relatives, some of his movements, and
the fact that he regularly came to Salt Lake every six
months for L. D. S. conference. Nevertheless, notwithstanding his earlier failure, Defendant was able to
promptly sue Walker once he was sued by Mr. Skousen.
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact reasonably supported by the evidence should be supported on appeal. Sine
v. Harper, supra.
Respectfully submitted,
FRAZIER & 'VOOD
J. Brent Wood
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

13

